Conspiracy theory as spatial practice: the case of the Sivas arson attack, Turkey by Çaylı, Eray
  
Eray Çaylı 
Conspiracy theory as spatial practice: the 
case of the Sivas arson attack, Turkey 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Çaylı, Eray (2018) Conspiracy theory as spatial practice: the case of the Sivas arson attack, 
Turkey. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 36 (2). pp. 255-272. ISSN 0263-7758 
DOI: 10.1177/0263775817742917 
 
© 2017 The Author 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87884/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
1  
Conspiracy Theory as Spatial Practice: The Case of the Sivas Arson Attack, Turkey 
 
 
 
Eray Çaylı 
 
London School of Economics (LSE)  
 
 
 
Abstract: This article discusses the relationship between conspiratorial thinking and physical 
space by focusing on the ways conspiracy theories regarding political violence shape and are 
shaped by the environments in which it is commemorated. Conspiratorial thinking features space 
as a significant element, but is taken to do so mainly figuratively. In blaming external powers  
and foreign actors for social ills, conspiracy theorists employ the spatial metaphor of inside 
versus outside. In perceiving discourses of transparency as the concealment rather than   
revelation of mechanisms of governance, conspiracy theorists engage the trope of a façade 
separating the space of power’s formulations from that of its operations. Studying the case of an 
arson attack dating from 1990s’ Turkey and its recent commemorations, this article argues that 
space mediates conspiracy theory not just figuratively but also physically, and as such serves to 
catalyze two of its deadliest characteristics: anonymity and non-linear causality. Attending to this 
mediation requires a shift of focus from what conspiracy theory is to what it does as a spatial 
practice. 
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Introduction 
 
On the 14th anniversary of the exogenously focused scenario that constituted the painful 
events of 2 July 1993, we don’t want to see outsiders in Sivas. … We shall lay flowers in 
memory of the dead. There’s no need for outsiders to participate (Haber Merkezi- 
Anadolu, 2007; italics added). 
Thus read the press statement released by a number of NGOs in Sivas, central-eastern Turkey, 
ahead of the 2007 episode of an annual commemoration the city has hosted since 1994. The 
commemoration concerns an arson attack that took place on 2 July 1993, when a hotel hosting 
the participants of a culture festival organized by an association representing followers of the 
Alevi faith—one of Turkey’s demographically minor social groups—was set alight by tens of 
assailants before an inactive law enforcement, thousands of onlookers, and live TV cameras, 
resulting in the death of thirty-three festival participants and two hotel workers. 
Delivered nearly a decade and a half after the arson attack, the statement epitomizes the 
conviction that the atrocity has not been fully investigated; only some 30 assailants caught on 
camera have received sentences, although a crime of such scale most likely involved the backing 
of a much larger network that has yet to be revealed. While this conviction is widespread across 
different social groups in Turkey, not as commonly shared is the answer to the question of 
exactly whom the network in question comprises. For those upholding the legacy of the festival 
participants killed in the blaze, the answer lies in the inaction of the governing authorities and 
that of the thousands of onlookers: it is they who encouraged the assailants (Tüleylioğlu, 2010). 
For mainstream politicians, journalists and various other influential figures in Sivas, however, 
the arson was but one part of a larger plot orchestrated by foreign powers (Ünsal, 1995; Doğan, 
2007). Hence the opening statement’s reference to the atrocity as “exogenously focused” (dış 
odaklı): an event whose origins remain outside the field of vision. 
As the statement indicates, in the years following the arson attack, allegations regarding 
“exogenously focused scenarios” turned out to affect new developments in and around the site of 
arson. First, they engulfed the commemorative procession held annually in Sivas by those 
upholding the legacy of the festival participants targeted in the arson, an initiative that pioneered 
various calls by intellectuals in the late 1990s and early 2000s for Turkey to “reckon with” its 
violent past (Sancar, 2007). More recently, an important implication of such allegations marked a 
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state-sponsored initiative to commemorate the atrocity on-site. The implication is that, insofar as 
the arson attack can be blamed on the outside, those inside are all victims, which therefore 
include not only the festival participants targeted in the arson but also the assailants who were in 
effect naive pawns. In 2011, the state’s transformation of the site of atrocity introduced a 
victims’ list that is inclusive of two individuals who were among the crowd outside the hotel 
during the blaze and were killed as it was belatedly dispersed by law enforcement. The 
transformation gave the site unprecedented visibility, evident in high-profile government 
representatives’ visits and mainstream networks’ live broadcasts of the annual commemoration 
held by those upholding the legacy of the festival participants killed in the arson. But it also 
introduced ever tighter security measures comprising checkpoints and barricades that sought to 
isolate the procession from Sivas and its inhabitants. 
The notions of inside versus outside and visual clarity versus obscurity, which 
characterize the above-mentioned references to exogenously focused scenarios, are among the 
most prominent tropes employed in both conspiracy theory and its scholarly discussions (Fortun 
and Fortun, 1999; Stewart, 1999; Dean, 2000; Bastian, 2003; Marcus and Powell, 2003; 
Comaroff and Comaroff, 2003; West and Sanders, 2003; Fenster, 2008). Yet, their significance 
here transcends mere figuration. The conspiracy theory, which implies that those who started the 
fire and those killed in it are both victims in their own right, inspires a state-sponsored on-site 
memorial. Conjointly, a change of attitude among mainstream politicians and media gives the 
arson attack greater visibility through live broadcasts and high-profile visits. But, on the ground, 
various law enforcement apparatuses are introduced to isolate the commemoration, physically 
reinforcing the inside-outside delineation that characterizes related conspiracy theories. If these 
developments establish conspiracy theory’s role in negotiating violent events, they also 
demonstrate that it hinges on a constant interplay between the figurative and the physical. 
Understanding this role, therefore, requires that the physical underpinnings and consequences of 
the visual and spatial tropes involved in conspiracy theory be considered seriously. 
How might this consideration contribute to analyses of the work conspiracy theory does 
with respect to violent events? I explore this question in light of my fieldwork on 
commemorative practices in Sivas, which I carried out at intervals over the two years following 
the transformation of the site of atrocity. In rethinking conspiracy theory and spatial 
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memorialization through one another, I draw on Wagner-Pacifici’s recent criticism (2010; 2015) 
of predominant approaches to analyzing commemoration for their tendency to cast the event 
being commemorated as complete rather than as continuing to unfold through commemorative 
practices. I argue that the environments in which the arson attack took place and is 
commemorated are significant to understanding the atrocity not because they serve as evidence 
refuting or validating conspiratorial thinking but because they act as catalysts of two of 
conspiracy theory’s deadliest characteristics: indeterminable authorship and non-linear causality. 
 
 
Conspiracy theory, physical space, and the commemoration of violent histories 
 
Among the most prominent tropes employed in conspiratorial thinking and its scholarly analyses 
are those that engage the medium of visuality. This is due largely to the preoccupation that both 
analysts and conspiracy theorists have had with transparency. Whether understood as remedy to 
conspiracy theory or as its symbiotic other, transparency has loomed large in relevant literature 
primarily because it captures the sense of sight that conditions much of conspiratorial thinking. A 
closer look into this literature, however, demonstrates that transparency may have spatial as well 
as visual implications. 
The first way transparency has featured in relevant literature concerns critiques of 
conspiracy theory’s commonplace associations with irrationality. Jamer Hunt suggests that 
conspiratorial thinking is “a style of interpretation” rather than “wild irrationality or psychosis” 
(1999: 22). If conspiracy “relies on secrecy and invisibility,” conspiracy theorists aim at “making 
visible the clandestine causal agents” (Hunt, 1999: 25). Mark Fenster posits conspiratorial 
thinking as a “practice that longs for a perfectly transparent, accessible democracy” (2008: ix). If 
such Habermasian approaches have treated transparency as an antidote to conspiracy and thus as 
the ultimate goal of conspiracy theorists, they have increasingly been subjected to criticism in the 
aftermath of the Cold War (Marcus, 1999), a historical period marked by not only the collapse of 
a physical wall preventing visual and spatial access to the political Other (West and Sanders, 
2003: 2) but also transparency’s becoming the mainstay of liberal democracies (Dean, 2000). 
Consider Harry West and Todd Sanders’ understanding of the relationship between transparency 
and conspiracy in this period. While acknowledging that conspiratorial thinking is preoccupied 
“with the operation of secret, mysterious, and/or unseen powers,” they question the assumption 
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that this indicates a quest for an abstract idea of transparency (2003: 7). Rather than take 
transparency at face value “in a world where varied institutions claim to give structure to the 
‘rational’ and ‘transparent’ operation of power,” conspiracy theorists maintain that power 
continues to operate “in realms normally concealed from view” (2003: 7). Michael and Kim 
Fortun similarly contend that conspiratorial thinking continues to proliferate despite liberal 
projects of transparency, because it “religiously set[s] up two separate worlds, this one of 
appearances and that other one of secrets” (1999: 159). For Kathleen Stewart, this indicates that 
conspiracy theories are driven by “a desire for an Other order of a true US and THEM coming 
from someplace outside our control” (1999: 13). 
At stake in the dynamics between transparency and conspiracy theory, then, is not just 
visuality but also spatiality: a delineation separating the space of power’s formulations from that 
of its operations. Moreover, this delineation is physically charged, as the delineator is taken to 
determine the degree to which the space of formulations is visible from that of operations. 
Noteworthy in this respect is West and Sanders’ discussion of transparency as the purported 
characteristic of “a surface to power” that conceals the space from which power operates (2003: 
16). If their discussion understands this “surface” to function in a more figurative than physical 
register, it might operate in the latter, too, especially in contexts characterized by technology’s 
impact on conspiratorial thinking. This is demonstrated by Jean and John Comaroff’s account of 
how developments in optic technologies between the 17th and 19th centuries shaped 
epistemological notions of not only transparency but also its “obverse: a concern with refraction, 
distortion, concealment, collusion,” accompanied by metaphors such as “the camera obscura” 
and “the hidden hand” (2003: 292). 
Comaroffs’ historical account is brought up to date by Nicholas Holm, who discusses the 
relation between conspiratorial thinking and surveillance technologies in post-9/11 US and UK. 
For him, this has implications for the surveillant as well as the surveilled: the latter suffers from a 
“fear of constant observation of the self,” or from the “paranoia-of-the watched,” while the 
surveillant feels obliged “to be constantly privy to all information in order to address potential 
threats,” which Holm calls the “paranoia-of-the watcher” (2009: 37). These two modalities of 
paranoia interact to produce results diametrically opposed to surveillance’s purported 
disciplinary motivations, engendering “excessive and aberrant behavior” rather than establish 
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“bodily and social discipline” (Holm, 2009.: 42). A case in point is presented by Misty Bastian’s 
discussion of the impact of live television broadcasting on a mid-1990s’ violent episode in the 
southeastern Nigerian city of Owerri, where conspiracy theories regarding ritual killings 
triggered a public riot. Rather than result in despair and inertia, broadcast images of a murdered 
child’s body parts prompted ordinary citizens to take to the streets and perform “a sense of local 
Owerri values and a local Owerri place at the heart of the globalized, surveilled, and modernized 
city” (2003: 85). 
If these discussions reiterate that sight and space may feature physically as well as 
figuratively in discourses and practices of transparency and/or conspiracy theory, they also 
indicate exactly what sort of a role physicality may play in this respect. Consider how optic 
improvements have engendered a concern with not only a visually enhanced sense of epistemic 
transparency but also its obverse, how surveillance technologies have in certain cases produced 
the opposite of their purported aim of social discipline, and how the dissemination of visual 
information on socially infuriating events has at times fueled rather than quell popular reaction. 
These instances all show that, far from serving as passive backdrop or conduit to discourses and 
practices of transparency and/or conspiracy theory, physical spaces and objects may well be 
shaping these actively. 
Frederic Jameson has proposed to understand conspiracy theory as “the poor person’s 
cognitive mapping” in the late capitalist age (1988: 356). Leaving aside momentarily the 
question of whether conspiracy theories are necessarily the preserve of “the poor person,” I 
would like to reconsider Jameson’s “mapping” in light of the discussion above: as not just a 
cognitive but also a physical spatial practice. This understanding recalls West and Sanders’ 
framing of transparency within Arjun Appadurai’s notion of “ideoscapes” (1990), as a keyword 
that condenses a larger set of ideas and facilitates their export to and superimposition on 
“geographical landscapes” (West and Sanders 2003: 10). But it differs from the way they place 
heavy emphasis on the first half of Appadurai’s notion (i.e., ideas) while neglecting its -scape- 
ness. My methodology here prioritizes the latter. In so doing, I hope to contribute to analyses of 
conspiracy theory as a “search for the missing plot” rather than “a rigid, all too clear plot”—as 
“practice” rather than just “theory” or “prefabricated ideology” (Stewart, 1999: 16). 
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This requires attending not just to the actors involved in conspiracy theory but also to the 
settings in which it unfolds. As Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold have demonstrated, 
anthropological work on the topic has often focused sharply on actors that produce, promulgate 
and/or subscribe to conspiracy theories. Yet, “[w]hat distinguishes conspiracy theories from  
other theories is the precise manner in which such theories are embedded in sociopolitical fields” 
and the various and often unforeseeable “use values” they acquire as a result (2011: 68). 
Pelkmans and Machold’s call to shift focus from actors to fields is significant for two reasons. 
First, it complicates the notion that conspiratorial thinking is the preserve of one set of actors or 
another à la Jameson’s “poor person.” Secondly, as any sociopolitical field is constituted not  
only by humans and their faculties but also by physical environments, it demonstrates the need to 
take seriously the role of objects and spaces in this constitution. 
This combination of an interest in physical environments and an attention to the 
productive force conspiracy theory becomes—virtually independent of its authors—when 
embedded in particular fields resonates with the way rumor features in Veena Das’ work on 
civilian unrest in post-Partition India. In a way that recalls George Marcus and Michael Powell’s 
argument that post-Cold War conspiracy theorizing is characterized by the reversal of “cause and 
effect” as it seeks to reckon with “the invisible, unpredictable and incalculable risks of our 
contemporary world” (2003: 332), Das understands rumor as a practice that is less about 
representing a preexisting reality than about precipitating a new one. As such, rumor does not 
merely communicate but produces events “in the very act of telling” by authorizing them (2007: 
108). The authorization, suggests Das, involves reanimating particular “regions” of the past, 
which are the stuff of collective consciousness, and the “regionality” of which is defined not by 
chronological proximity but by affinity to the “affective qualities of the present moment” (Das, 
2007: 100). Rumor produces new events—in this case, violent events—by sociohistorically 
anchoring them in these regions (Das, 2007: 121). But rumor’s productive capabilities concern 
space as well as time; its materializations are not uniform across geography. Certain physical 
environments across which rumor circulates significantly shape its consequences in degree if not 
in kind (Das, 2007: 135-161). Rumor, therefore, is a means of spatial production as well as a 
sociopolitical one. 
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There are glimpses of an understanding of conspiratorial thinking as just such a 
production in Carol Delaney’s ethnography of a village in central Turkey. She discerns the 
spatial demarcation of an inside from its outside as a trope employed frequently by her 
interlocutors vis-à-vis adverse events or the likelihood thereof. “Bad and threatening things,” 
they believe, “come from outside … the body, the family, the village, or the nation” (1991: 206- 
7). Tangible implications of this trope are discernable in the ways villagers experience the village 
and their houses. The village’s topographical positioning enables a clear view of those 
approaching it, giving “villagers the sense that they have some control over who enters” 
(Delaney 1991: 206). New roads connecting the village to the world outside are met with 
skepticism by the villagers: if roads mean better logistics, they also expose the village “to 
polluting influences from town” (Delaney 1991: 207). On an architectural level, villagers’ 
perception of their houses as clean and streets as dirty has physical underpinnings: “Houses are 
swept several times a day,” whereas rubbish “is dumped outside the house onto the street” and 
remains untended except by passing animals that eat the organic bits (Delaney 1991: 237). 
Unlike Das, however, Delaney’s account does not feature a particular event or set of events, and 
is therefore somewhat historically unspecific. 
In this article, I aim to further explore the glimpses Delaney provides into the physical 
spatial implications of conspiratorial thinking in Turkey. In so doing I understand conspiracy 
theory in light of the discussion above: as a practice whose authors may not always be singularly 
determinable and whose causality is not always necessarily linear. This, moreover, is a practice 
that mediates events by operating across specific histories and anchoring the present in parts of 
the past which are qualitatively linked to it and to one another. In my case these histories center 
on an arson attack that took place in 1990s’ Turkey, and the ways it has recently been 
commemorated on-site. 
Thinking conspiracy theory and spatial commemoration together in such a way has 
implications for memory studies, whose rapid growth over the past three decades has rendered it 
something of a natural home for scholarship on commemorative practices. Throughout these 
decades, memory studies arguably witnessed a gradual but significant shift; collective 
remembrance has come to be increasingly understood as not “a thing” but rather “a process” with 
“varieties, contradictions, and dynamism” (Olick 2008: 159), and as productive of not just 
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“meanings” about the past but also “affects and effects” in the present (Rigney, 2015). While this 
resonates with my proposal to rethink commemoration and conspiracy theory as interrelated 
practices, it has left intact a longstanding methodological assumption I aim to overcome—the 
assumption that the past and present in question each constitutes a discrete and singular event. 
In questioning this assumption, I take my cue from Robin Wagner-Pacifici (2010; 2015). 
For Wagner-Pacifici, memory studies scholars overwhelmingly assume commemorative  
practices to pertain only to “the aftermath, after-effects, or afterlife of . . . actual events that have, 
essentially, ended” (Wagner-Pacifici, 2015: 22). For instance, representations of an event  
deemed complete, such as those produced through memorialization (Wagner-Pacifici, 2010: 
1367), are misunderstood as, or mistaken for, “memory” (Wagner-Pacifici, 2015: 23), whereas 
they are in effect “part and parcel” of its continuing development (Wagner-Pacifici, 2010: 1362; 
Wagner-Pacifici, 2015: 26). The assumption becomes especially problematic in the case of 
violent events; while the violence that marks the “past” being commemorated is acknowledged, 
the violence inherent in the “cultural” work of that past’s being named, appropriated, and 
displaced in its apparent “aftermath” is often overlooked (Wagner-Pacifici, 2010: 1358; Wagner- 
Pacifici, 2015: 22). 
The problem is perhaps most evident in the specific body of literature on spatial 
memorialization. Monuments and memorials are explored in terms of their various processual  
and relational aspects, including the contestations and controversies surrounding their design and 
construction (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, 1991; Linenthal, 2001: 117; Carrier, 2005: 228; 
Stevens and Franck, 2016: 236; Young, 2016: 16), their relationships to the urban settings in 
which they are located (Aguilera, 2014: 110), and the myriad ways publics interact with them 
(Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, 1991: 416). This multifarious exploration has influentially 
demonstrated the significance of memorialization as pertaining not only to its representation of 
the past event but also to the various present-day events involved in its cultural production and 
reception. But it has left intact the methodological assumption that the event being memorialized, 
i.e., “violence,” is complete and therefore ontologically distinct from the events surrounding its 
memorialization, i.e., “culture.” 
My focus on conspiracy theory as thus far developed requires that this assumption be 
dispensed with. For, due to its non-linear causality and violently productive capabilities, 
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conspiracy theory refuses to perceive events as complete and to settle with only explaining them. 
Rather, it contributes to their continuing development. What role, then, if any, might the physical 
environments where events as such take place play in this contribution? And how might an 
understanding of this role contribute to analyses of the work conspiracy theory does with respect 
to violent histories? 
 
 
Conspiracy theorizing in Turkey 
 
Conspiracy theorizing has become increasingly influential over the past three decades in Turkey 
such that it now has across-the-board resonance. The roots of this influence lie in the early 20th 
century, which witnessed the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, and 
more specifically in two events that marked this transition and over time became the stuff of 
conspiracy theories. The first is the 1908 constitutional revolution led by the Young Turks,  
which climaxed in the toppling of Abdülhamid II—the last Ottoman monarch to reign not just on 
paper but also in practice over the crumbling Empire—and laid the groundwork for the founding 
of the secular republic in the early 1920s (Baer, 2013). That the Young Turk movement was 
based in Salonika (today’s Thessaloniki), then still a predominantly Jewish-inhabited city and 
antecedently the headquarters of a 17th-century wave of religious conversions from Judaism to 
Islam, was made by anti-secularists into the stuff of the conspiracy theory that its members were 
crypto Jews acting in the interests of the global Jewry—a theory later extended to the modern- 
day republic’s Salonika-born founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Baer, 2013). 
The second relevant event is the post-World War I Treaty of Sèvres, which partitioned 
much of today’s Turkey into Allied-controlled territories. Although the Turkish National 
Campaign of 1919-22, which enabled the founding of the modern-day republic, was largely 
successful in overturning Sèvres, over time the treaty became the stuff of what is now known as 
the “Sèvres paranoia” (Göçek, 2011: 98-184): “the conviction that the external world is 
conspiring to weaken and carve up Turkey” (Kirişçi, 1999: 258). Often working in tandem with 
the above-mentioned anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (Nefes, 2015), the Sèvres paranoia became 
especially prevalent in the post-Cold War era when the preceding decades’ symmetrical political 
alignments among states began to complexify (Taşpınar, 2005: 214 fn.1). It has continued to 
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thrive in the new millennium, as previously peripheral conspiracy theories permeated the 
mainstream. This was possible first because a political movement rooted in religious 
conservatism, which has historically been among the proponents of the above-mentioned 
conspiracy theories as it was largely excluded from the secularist republican project for the better 
part of the 20th century (Gürpınar, 2013: 425-426; cf. Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 191), rose to power 
in the shape of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and consolidated its grip through 
consecutive majority governments (Guida, 2008)—an ongoing phenomenon that has just entered 
its fifteenth year at the time of writing. Secondly, having now found themselves in the margins of 
the new political mainstream and facing ideological bottleneck, secular nationalists sought to 
regain influence by resorting to populism, the prime pillars of which in Turkey comprise 
conspiracy theories of the above-mentioned sort (Baer, 2013: 554-555). Therefore, such theories 
now find appeal in Turkey among intellectuals, ordinary citizens, and politicians of various and 
otherwise highly different persuasions (Nefes, 2013). 
This background is relevant to the Sivas case in at least two respects. The first concerns 
the historical context of the arson attack: the immediate aftermath of the Cold War when 
conspiracy theories began to gain wider popularity especially in geographies like Turkey “where 
cold-war [sic] disciplines and interventions shaped the experience of civil society” (Marcus, 
1999: 3). It was in this context that conspiracy theory began to function increasingly as a practice 
grounded in “actual experience” rather than as a merely discursive representation of affairs 
(Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 182). The second reason concerns the inaugural decade of the 21st   
century when, simultaneously with the proliferation of conspiratorial thinking, long-fought 
campaigns for truth and justice regarding the Sivas arson attack and various other political 
atrocities in Turkey’s 20th-century history gained unprecedented visibility. The decade 
culminated in a state-sponsored project of what senior figures like the then Prime Minister  
Tayyip Erdoğan called “democratization” (demokratikleşme) and “transparentization” 
(şeffaflaşma) (Ministry of State for Religious Affairs, 2010: 5). In 2011 these developments 
yielded results relevant to the site of the Sivas arson attack, whose conversion into a memorial 
museum had long been the subject of a campaign by those upholding the legacy of the festival 
participants killed in the blaze. In response to this campaign, and following a series of meetings 
with the city’s “notables” and representatives of its “civil society” (Ministry of State for 
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Religious Affairs, 2010: 12-13), the state transformed the site into a commemorative-cum- 
educational institution (Çaylı, 2014). 
 
 
Conspiracy theories regarding the Sivas arson attack and their spatial underpinnings 
 
It is against this background that the mainstream press in Sivas and the city’s “notables” have 
espoused the sort of conspiratorial thinking that marks this article’s opening quote, implying that 
the culture festival in 1993 whose guests were attacked in the arson, the arson attack itself, and 
subsequent initiatives of commemorating it on site are all the work of outside forces. This raises 
the question: outside of what or of where? To explore this question, consider, alongside the 
opening quote, the below excerpt also from the local press in Sivas, which is especially 
significant in this respect as its coverage of the culture festival in late June and early July 1993 is 
known to have aggravated the atmosphere that culminated in the arson attack (Coşkun, 1995:  
355 fn. 1). Written by the long-time chair of the Sivas journalists association, who also authored 
a monograph on the arson attack (Ünsal, 1995), the excerpt was published as the editorial of one 
of the city’s best-selling newspapers a couple of days before the atrocity’s tenth anniversary 
when the commemorations had begun to draw thousands of participants instead of the hundreds 
they had until then managed to attract. 
Neither the murderers of ASALA [the Beirut-based Armenian militant organization 
active between the late 1970s and the early 1990s], who were behind the events [the 
arson attack], nor the festival participants were invited to Sivas by its people. … These 
plotters are the same hitmen of ASALA who insist on keeping the events on the agenda. 
Let’s all be level-headed and vigilant tomorrow [during the commemoration], and avoid 
falling into ASALA’s trap. … Tomorrow, the perpetrators will likely mourn alongside 
them [those who claim the legacy of the festival participants]. … They first kill, and then 
weep at graves (Ünsal, 2003). 
As epitomized by both the editorial and the quote that opened this article, conspiratorial readings 
of the arson attack blame it on actors from outside Turkey. While in the above quote these actors 
are said to consist of ASALA, this has proven interchangeable with any other group considered 
“exogenous” at a given time, as evident in the blaming of the pro-Kurdish armed organization 
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PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in this respect by indeed the same writer cited above (AA, 
2011). Such readings of the affair therefore imagine Turkey as an immaculate and peaceful 
inside threatened by a hostile and polluted outside. 
It is this sociospatial imagination that has been mapped onto the physical space of central 
Sivas, as indicated in the above quote’s emphases on the city and its people. These emphases 
originally implicated two sets of actors. The first were the alleged ringleaders of the arsonist 
crowd, on the basis that they were entirely unbeknownst to the people of Sivas and have not 
reappeared ever since, whether as suspects in court or as inhabitants of the city (Ministry of State 
for Religious Affairs, 2010: 52). Secondly, the organizers of the culture festival whose 
participants died in the blaze were labeled as outsiders, accused of both conducting an event 
many of whose aspects were allegedly foreign to the city’s way of life and refusing to cancel it 
despite being reputedly given the opportunity to do so vis-à-vis the likelihood of a violent 
backlash which became increasingly apparent in the run-up to the arson (Ministry of State for 
Religious Affairs, 2010: 67). But, over time, such accusations began to also engulf the organizers 
and participants of the commemorations held annually in Sivas, arguably to the effect of 
amplifying, by association, the earlier insinuations leveled at the organizers of the culture festival 
in July 1993. 
Unpacking this effect requires first revisiting certain organizational and historical aspects 
of the 1993 culture festival. Organized in central Sivas by an Alevi association headquartered in 
Ankara, the festival was not the first but fourth of its kind. The inaugural festival had taken place 
in summer 1978 in Banaz in provincial Sivas, which is famously the native village of a 16th- 
century minstrel revered in Alevism (Koerbin, 2011: 191 ft. 3). Although the festival had been 
intended as an annual event, it was interrupted due to sociopolitical unrest across late 1970s’ 
Turkey, which partly also targeted Alevis in the country’s central and eastern cities such as 
Malatya, Çorum, Sivas and Maraş and led many to flee for metropolises like Istanbul, Ankara, 
and Izmir, or even beyond, for Europe (Eral, 1995). Then followed the 1980 military coup, 
whose drastic restrictions on social rights precluded events like this festival. Therefore, the 
organizers had to wait another decade to repeat the event. Like the inaugural festival, its second 
and third episodes in 1991 and 1992, respectively, were held in Banaz and appealed mainly to 
Alevis. But in 1993, the festival board took the unprecedented decision of partly relocating to 
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central Sivas and composing a two-day program that was not only Alevism-related. They thus 
facilitated what was for many an organizer and participant a return to the center of the geography 
that they or their parents had been forced to flee in the 1970s and 1980s. Part of a wider 
phenomenon called the “Alevi Revival” (van Bruinessen, 1996; Çamuroğlu, 1998), it is this 
aspect of an outreach or return to the city that has led to the perception that the festival was the 
work of outsiders infiltrating Sivas (Deliktaş, 2000; Akbulut, 2006; Haber Merkezi-Anadolu, 
2007). 
A similar perception began in the 2000s to color the way the commemorations held in 
Sivas were featured in the media, as the decade saw the annual event attract increasing numbers 
of participants each year. Evidence to back this perception has been derived from the significant 
role of the Cologne-based European Alevi Unions Confederation in organizing these events and 
drawing large crowds to them—an example of the financial and ideological support Alevis in 
Europe have provided to those in Turkey (Özyürek, 2009: 240). To be sure, the main reason why 
such an organization exists in Germany in the first place is that, insofar as 1970s’, 1980s’ and 
1990s’ migration from Turkey by members of marginalized social groups like Alevis is 
concerned, fleeing political violence was as significant a motivation as were better economic 
prospects (Ögelman et al., 2002). Indeed, several individuals with such a migration background 
were among the Sivas arson attack victims (Aksoy, 2014: 13). That Europe-based Alevis, many 
of whom are indeed originally from Sivas, may continue to engage with Turkey is implicated by 
conspiracy theorists as an intervention by the EU and specifically by Germany, where they were 
given in the 1980s the opportunity for the first time to legally organize under their ethnic and 
religious identities and where many of them continue to reside (Wilpert, 1990). So mainstream 
has this perception become as to repeatedly feature in statements made by the long-time Prime 
Minister and current President of Republic Tayyip Erdoğan (Taştekin, 2014). 
In sum, conspiratorial readings of the arson attack have made two interrelated inside- 
outside delineations. The first delineation has featured the sociospatial imaginary of Turkey as 
inside, and has blamed the arson attack on its outside. The second has treated central Sivas as 
inside and, in so doing, has helped concretize the first delineation. In the next section, I unpack 
the ways these delineations have come to shape and be shaped by on-site commemorations of the 
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atrocity, which assumed new significance in the early 2010s when discourses of “reckoning with 
the past” culminated in tangible developments. 
 
 
Conspiracy theory and spatial commemoration in Sivas 
 
My fieldwork in Sivas consisted of two components. The first was an ethnography of the site of 
atrocity within the daily life of Sivas. This involved spending entire workdays inside the  
building, whose recent state-sponsored transformation has opened it to free-of-charge visits 
between 8.30am and 5pm during the workweek, and in-depth conversations with a group of 
Sivas residents. The second component was to participant observe the site’s significance within 
the annual commemoration, which I attended twice (in 2011 and 2012) with groups coming from 
outside central Sivas. 
The site’s recent transformation has introduced a “Memory Corner,” a 70-squaremeter 
room whose centerpiece is a 3-by-4.5-meter stainless-steel structure complete with a victims’ 
name list, an electrically operated set of thirty-seven fountains, and a couple of statements. There 
are as many fountains as there are names commemorated: thirty-seven. As previously mentioned, 
the number includes not only the thirty-three participants of the culture festival and the two hotel 
workers killed inside the hotel but also the two members of the crowd outside, a decision state 
authorities have defended as “a human-centric” refusal “to discriminate between the dead” 
(Yalçınkaya and Ceylan, 2011). Of the two statements, one is more relevant to this article than 
the other (a purported Mustafa Kemal Atatürk quote emphasizing “national unity and 
togetherness”) and so will be explored at greater length. This statement is unsigned and reads “In 
the painful incident that took place on 2 July 1993, thirty-seven of our people have lost their  
lives. With the wish that such pains do not recur…” It is in effect a synopsis of the following 
speech that Minister of State Faruk Çelik delivered in 2010 when he became the first government 
representative to visit the site: 
2 July 1993 is one of the painful days in our history … On this day, insidious foci sought 
to stage their dark scenarios. … [This] is the pain of the whole of Turkey. There can be  
no sides in this incident; to take a side in this incident means to not extinguish the fire. … 
The screen of fog surrounding this incident has not yet been lifted. … It is no other 
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person than yet again us, the people of Sivas, who have the remedy for our problems. … I 
remember with grace and respect our thirty-seven citizens who lost their lives on 2 July 
1993 (Aytekin et al., 2010). 
These emphases on “the people of Sivas” and/or “the whole of Turkey” as sufferers, on “our 
thirty-seven citizens” as victims, on the “dark scenarios” that constituted the arson, and on the 
“screen of fog” surrounding it echo conspiracy theories that have placed the blame on 
“exogenous foci” (dış odaklar or dış mihraklar). The echo is discernible not only textually, i.e., 
in the statements, but also numerically, i.e., in the thirty-seven names and fountains. This has led 
those upholding the legacy of the thirty-three festival participants to refuse to enter the building 
that now hosts the Memory Corner, as they believe doing so would be to legitimize it. 
But there are also various others who pass by the building without ever setting foot  
inside, and do so due to certain assumptions they have about it. As some of these assumptions 
concern the building’s exterior, it merits further exploration. The recent transformation preserved 
the façade’s structural composition but reclad it entirely. The fenestration now consists of one- 
way mirror windows that render interiors invisible from the outside. The rest of the façade is clad 
in composite panels in the pastel shades of dark red and beige characteristic of state buildings. 
There are no signs outside the building regarding the services provided or the working hours.  
The only sign, except that which bears the institution’s name, is a plaque that reads, “this 
building is monitored twenty-four hours by CCTV.” Made of glossy brass, the plaque looks 
much more ostentatious than the usual CCTV disclaimer; I observed that it misled potential 
visitors who were confusedly drawn to it in the absence of any other sign. The confusion was 
most evident during lunch breaks when the institution closes its doors for an hour. Potential 
visitors would come, see the closed doors, search for a sign, only to notice the CCTV disclaimer, 
turn away perplexedly and leave. All these features led the building to exude an appearance that 
potential visitors found inaccessible at best and intimidating at worst. 
In 2011 and 2012 these issues were compounded due to the way the institution was 
staffed. In fall 2011, four people—a director, a kindergarten teacher and two primary school 
teachers—were employed here by the Ministry of National Education. When I returned next 
summer, the time of year when the building’s visitor numbers are at their highest due to visits to 
the city by people with migration background who originally hail from Sivas, the director was 
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still in place but the teachers had left—each visiting class was now asked to bring along its own 
teacher, I was told. In their stead, there were four new staff members: two men in their late 
twenties, a man in his mid-thirties, and a woman in her early twenties. They were all unskilled 
workers hired through the state’s employment agency on contracts ranging from six to twelve 
months. There was no training scheme in place regarding the site’s historical significance or 
anything else for that matter. Not much was expected of the employees except, in the words of 
the man in his mid-thirties, “to keep this place clean, tidy and orderly, as the director likes it that 
way.” The director’s occasional admonitions also included, according to the man in his late 
twenties, reminders about how “we should never speak with any visitors about the incident.” 
If in its institutional inconspicuousness the building sought to downplay the contested 
legacy of the arson attack, this in effect exacerbated speculations regarding on whose side its 
occupants might be vis-à-vis the atrocity. Consider the case of a couple of women (one in her 
mid-twenties, and the other, early fifties), who in summer 2012 passed by the entrance back and 
forth several times without entering inside. The female employee noticed them and went out to 
welcome them in. The younger woman explained that “we were here last year, too, but hesitated 
to enter. You see; my mom is covered, and although I’m not, we thought her headscarf could 
cause eyebrows to raise.”1 The employee replied that they welcome all members of the public 
indiscriminately. Standing at the doorstep, the women explained why they had second thoughts 
about entering the building. The mother said: 
I chair the AKP women’s branch in my hometown. Plus, I am covered. Hence my 
belonging to the opposite camp. Nevertheless, I condemn this terrible atrocity. Being 
human is enough to condemn it, although you and I might not be of the same opinion. 
The staff member interrupted the woman’s comments: “What do you mean by the opposite 
camp? To whom did you think this place belongs? The Alevis?” The women both nodded in 
affirmation. The employee corrected them: “No, no, no; not at all. This place belongs to the 
state.” Only after having received this clarification did the women go inside. 
Many residents of Sivas have also yet to visit the revamped building. I observed this not 
only during my research inside the building, when I found out that only about one in ten visitors 
was a resident of Sivas, but also during the regular and lengthy evening conversations I had with 
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men in their late twenties and early thirties at what is one of the oldest and most popular 
coffeehouses in the city.2 Described by my interlocutors as “the local intellectual hangout,” this 
is an alcohol-free establishment whose clientele consists virtually only of men. My interlocutors 
here included several outspoken supporters of the BBP (Great Union Party), whose ideology 
synthesizes Sunni Islamism and Turkish nationalism (Tapia, 2011: 309). Sivas is famously the 
BBP stronghold and, at the time of my fieldwork, was the only municipality governed by one of 
its members. The party is immensely pertinent to the arson attack, owing to how some thirty 
survivors fled the blaze: through the air well to an adjacent building then occupied by the BBP. 
BBP supporters take pride in this story and present it as proof that they have done their utmost to 
mitigate the consequences of what was a dark plot orchestrated by external powers (Doğan, 
2007: 189-192). The survivors, however, have recounted that they had to force their way into the 
building; at first, they were cursed at and chased away by those inside the party’s offices 
(Günbulut, 1994: 205-206). BBP supporters believe that such claims have unjustly stigmatized 
them as perpetrators, and caused innocent onlookers to receive heavy court sentences (Öztürk et 
al., 2011). 
Hence the interest my research stimulated among the members of my coffeehouse circle, 
whose numbers ranged from five to twelve per night. Many of them not only openly condemned 
the arson attack as the work of “exogenous foci” but also maintained that the AKP “government 
do not want 2 July to be elucidated,” as evinced by the continuing lack of a comprehensive 
investigation that could “reveal the actual plotters.” Regarding the recent transformation of the 
site of the blaze, my interlocutors were unanimous that it is not a project that speaks, or would be 
of interest, to “the people of Sivas:” 
The ordinary resident of Sivas will never go there. He/she would say “what’s going on 
behind those mirrored windows?” and think that they are sacralizing that place and that 
the Culture Center is the penultimate stage before it becomes a cemevi [place of Alevi 
worship; literally: house of gathering]. Yes; many think that the place will soon become a 
house of worship where they will start performing semah [an Alevi ritual]. I personally 
have not been there to this day, and neither have any of the people I know. 
This range of reactions demonstrates that the architectural banality and institutional ambiguity 
resulting from the site’s recent transformation has led to its being disowned by not just those 
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upholding the legacy of the thirty-three festival participants but also various others. This banality 
and ambiguity, therefore, are not merely a consequence of conspiracy theory—the theory that the 
arson attack was an “exogenously focused” event—but also its instigator. If the project’s implicit 
subscription to the conspiratorial reading of the arson attack as the work of “exogenous foci” is 
packaged in a refusal “to discriminate between the dead,” the architectural banality and 
ambiguity embodying it have caused conspiracy theories to ramify rather than subside. The  
extent of this ramification is such that the project itself has triggered new conspiratorial rumors 
regarding how certain Alevis are collaborating with the authorities to hijack the building. 
The physical implications of conspiracy theories involving the building extend beyond its 
walls. Consider the commemorative procession held in Sivas annually by those upholding the 
legacy of the festival participants killed in the arson. Over the past decade this event has drawn 
increasingly larger crowds to Sivas from across Turkey and beyond. Following the hotel’s 
commemorative-cum-educational transformation in 2011 amid state-endorsed discourses of 
reckoning with the past, the commemoration was unprecedentedly broadcast live by a popular 
nationwide TV channel. The event proceeds along a two-kilometer route starting in Alibaba, the 
reputed “Alevi neighborhood” of central Sivas and one of the scenes of the late 1970s’ wave of 
violence against Alevis and leftists. It ends at the site of the blaze with the laying of flowers. 
Most commemoration participants then return to Alibaba in groups albeit not in the shape of a 
single collective, which they take during the procession. 
There are numerous ways this annual event shapes and is shaped by the insinuation that it 
is the work of outside forces. In both 2011 and 2012 the police conducted checkpoints at the 
border of central Sivas to stop and search those travelling to the city for the commemoration. 
Police officers invariably greeted people here by saying, “good morning our guests, welcome to 
Sivas.” One of my interlocutors, a civil servant in his mid-fifties who indeed originally hails  
from Sivas but moved to Ankara in the early 1980s for sociopolitical as well as economic 
reasons, challenged the police: “Guests? Who says we’re guests? I’m from Sivas. You may now 
be stationed here but who knows where you’re originally from!” He later told me that, while 
these checkpoints have always been conducted, they used to be more technical than social affairs 
of the sort the officers’ remarks sought to render them. My interlocutor therefore exposed the 
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function implicit in what otherwise seemed a benign gesture of hospitality: to demarcate the 
space of the commemorations as the outside of Sivas. 
Such attempts at delineation continued throughout the day and became much more  
overtly physical, as streets leading to the route of the procession were double-barricaded. An 
interlocutor in his early thirties, who is a non-Alevi resident of central Sivas and lives in a 
building situated about halfway through the route, remarked that in 2011 he left home wanting to 
participate in the commemoration only to run right into barricades. Police officers told him that if 
he wants to join the procession he ought to go up to Alibaba, the reputed “Alevi neighborhood” 
where the procession starts. My interlocutor “didn’t feel like doing so, as I don’t know anyone 
there,” and gave up the idea. 
Nearer the site of the blaze, the distance between the double barricades expanded to 
constitute a buffer zone across which commemorations participants and residents of Sivas gazed 
at one another. At times this spatial separation took forms less peaceful than the exchange of 
gazes. Disapproving gestures coming from some balconies along the route were met with a   
group of young commemoration participants who chanted “Sivas’ arsonists—watching from 
balconies.”3 Finally, the procession itself became subject to an obstacle in what was perhaps the 
least technically justifiable “security” measure by the police. Whereas commemoration 
participants would formerly be able to walk right up to the doorstep of the hotel and lay flowers, 
from 2011 onwards—following the site’s transformation—the authorities began to try and 
obstruct the procession nearer the building. In 2011 they mounted barricades about fifteen meters 
ahead of the building, blocking off the street where it is located. When the participants insisted  
on laying flowers at the building’s doorstep as per tradition, the scuffle between them and the 
police resulted in the latter’s use of teargas. The following year, the police moved the barricades 
about 400 meters further up along the route, only to pull it back to where they were in 2011 after 
an hour-long sit-in by commemoration participants. Even then, once the procession reached the 
street of the building targeted in the blaze, it emerged that the barricades had morphed from 
simple police shields into a steel wall, which has since then become a standard architectural 
feature of the site on commemoration day. 
Rather than serve their purported purpose of providing safety and security for the 
commemoration, the barricades therefore functioned as an instigator of aggression. They did so 
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not only by isolating the procession and thus rendering it the outside of downtown Sivas, but also 
by enabling the conditions for the portrayal of commemoration participants as troublemakers 
aiming to provoke the city’s residents. The portrayal continued to reverberate after the  
procession, as teargassed scenes captured by the press and especially by the mainstream TV 
channel that live broadcast the event circulated in news reports and national dailies the following 
day under such headlines as “18 years on, and yet another provocation” (Türkiye, 2011). 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
I have argued that conspiracy theories dwelling on “exogenous foci” did not only continue 
unabated but also ramified in Sivas throughout the early 2010s when the state-sponsored project 
of “democratization” and “transparentization” was in full swing. Contrary to what has been 
rightly suggested with respect to various other cases (Fortun and Fortun, 1999; Stewart, 1999; 
West and Sanders, 2003), however, this was not due to an adverse reaction to the project. Indeed, 
many of those who subscribed to conspiracy theories did not so much categorically disbelieve  
the promises of “democratization” and “transparentization” as they expected these to translate 
into tangible, judicial results in the shape of a comprehensive investigation into the full range of 
culprits. 
Conspiracy theories dwelling on “exogenous foci” ramified in early 2010s’ Sivas because 
their central trope found physical expression in practices of spatial commemoration concomitant 
with the state’s project of “democratization” and “transparentization.” These practices included 
the annual procession, where checkpoints and barricades blurred the lines separating security 
from provocation, hospitality from hostility, and aggressee from aggressor. They also included 
the site of the blaze, whose architectural transformation resulted in an aura of bureaucratic 
anonymity and a sweeping approach to remembrance that echoed understandings of the arson 
attack as outsiders infiltrating the inside. If these developments may appear to have aimed at 
curbing the contestation surrounding the atrocity, they produced the exact opposite effect. And 
they did so not only among those upholding the legacy of the thirty-three festival participants but 
also among the adherents of conspiratorial thinking, who for instance began to embroil the 
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architectural transformation of the site of atrocity itself, and those behind it, in the ways they 
theorized the arson attack as conspiracy. 
Conspiracy theory, then, seeps through the “state” as well “society,” reiterating that these 
categories are empirically much less distinct from each other than often assumed (Navaro- 
Yashin, 2002: 152). That is, it serves less as a challenge posed by “society” to the “state” than as 
a prominent mechanism through which to forge the former as distinct from, and at times even 
antagonistic to, the latter. This, moreover, is a spatial mechanism, and one which becomes 
especially pernicious in the case of violent events. By conceptualizing “society” as “inside,” 
conspiracy theory flattens various other, empirically grounded distinctions produced by violence 
(e.g., those between victim, perpetrator, bystander, and survivor). By seeking physical evidence 
for this conceptualization in environments that have in effect been shaped—partly, if not 
wholly—by violent events, it naturalizes violence’s spatial legacy. It is this flattening and this 
naturalization that a close and nuanced attention to conspiracy theory’s spatiality might help 
unravel. 
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1. The 1920s’ secular reforms that inaugurated the Republic of Turkey prevented state employees from wearing 
headscarves at work. In the 1990s this culminated in a full-fledged ban affecting the recipients as well as 
providers of state services (Elver, 2012). The ban was lifted gradually in the late 2000s and early 2010s except 
for judges, prosecutors and military personnel (Asimovic-Akyol, 2016). 
2. Coffeehouses have held immense sociopolitical significance in Turkey throughout the late Ottoman (Kırlı, 2004), 
early republican (Özkoçak, 2007), and Cold War (Beeley, 1970) periods. 
3. “Sivas’ı yakanlar: balkonlardan bakanlar.” For accounts of similar instances from past commemorations, see 
Başkaya, 2006, and Kaçmaz, 2009. 
